Accounting Options and Conglomerate Growth by Hill, Henry P.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 5 Volume 44, Spring 1970, Special 
Edition 
Article 61 
December 2012 
Accounting Options and Conglomerate Growth 
Henry P. Hill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Hill, Henry P. (1970) "Accounting Options and Conglomerate Growth," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 
5 , Article 61. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss5/61 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ACCOUNTING OPTIONS AND
CONGLOMERATE GROWTH
HENRY P. HILL*
The terms "accounting options" and "conglomerates" seem to acquire
a special kind of evil connotation when used together. It is timely to ex-
amine the characteristics of the members of this notorious couplet and see
if it is possible to explain what it is that has led to an intensive effort to
separate the two and thereby render each relatively harmless. We may even
arrive at some conclusion as to whether the current effort is properly directed
and whether it has a reasonable chance of achieving its goal. Even more to
the point, an analysis of this union may lead to a conclusion as to whether
achievement of the goal of separation will truly constitute success.
Conglomerates have been accused of taking undue advantage of a num-
ber of the devices of the modern business world. Antitrust infringement,
mistreatment of minority stockholders and circumvention of the economic
laws of the marketplace have all been laid at the door of the modern con-
glomerate. Whether these charges are true is a proper subject for debate,
but in this paper we shall confine ourselves to one issue, one alleged dis-
tortion of business practice: the misuse of accounting options "to glamorize
their profit performance to exploit speculative behavior in a securities mar-
ket hungry for 'growth' type companies."'
THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING OPTIONS
Without, for the moment, dealing with conglomerates specifically, let
us consider the general subject of accounting options. Are there many avail-
able? Are they available in many situations? The answer to both questions
is unfortunately and necessarily "yes." If "accounting options" means
diverse ways of dealing with ostensibly similar situations, there are many
occasions for selection.
For example, in determining how to measure his profit on an article of
merchandise sold, should a merchant compare his selling price with (1) the
cost of the oldest of the particular item he had in stock on the theory that
good inventory management requires putting new stock in the storeroom
and old stock on the shelves; (2) the cost of his latest purchase of that partic-
ular item on the theory that a place to sell is no good without something to
sell and, therefore, to some degree inventory is as fixed as capital assets; or
(3) should he consider that all of a particular kind of item are essentially
the same and, therefore, the appropriate thing to do is average costs? Even
* Partner, Price Waterhouse & Co., New York.
' Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (remarks
of Dr. Willard F. Mueller).
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though the alternative methods can give widely divergent results, all three
are acceptable.
Should a company expense its research costs or should it defer them
until the products that flow from the research reach the market? Conserva-
tism dictates exclusion from assets by expensing of anything as intangible
as investments in research and development. The desire for determination
of true profitability of business activity by matching cost and revenue, on
the other hand, leads to deferral of a charge until successful exploitation of
the fruits of the research.
Numerous other accounting options exist, and the type of consideration
involved in resolving choices having been adequately illustrated, it should
be sufficient to refer to some of them briefly. An incomplete list would
include:
Arithmetic formulas to calculate depreciation;
Replacement cost versus realizable value, to determine market values in
inventory, using the lower of cost or market calculations;
Determination of the lower of cost or market calculations by either an
individual item method or an overall method;
The degree to which to provide for income taxes that would be levied
on parent companies, if they bring home income from consolidated
subsidiaries;
Deferral or expensing of mineral development costs;
Recognition of unrealized gains and losses in long-term investments;
Selection of assumptions in estimating pension expense;
Spreading or flowing through investment credits.
Accounting options arise from either of two conditions. They either
reflect different ways of viewing similar situations or they result from the
different conceptual bases of the balance sheet and the income statement.
Different views usually are verbalized in arithmetic terms and result in
simple arithmetic-type formulas, such as "first in-first out," "declining bal-
ance," "straight line," etc.
The different conceptual bases of the two primary statements (balance
sheet and income) have long been a difficult problem. The balance sheet is
billed as a statement of assets and liabilities and ought to be prepared on a
conservative basis; that is, doubtful assets should be excluded and estimates
of probable liabilities ought to be included. On the other hand, the ideal in-
come statement should match revenue with the costs of producing that
revenue even if the costs come long before the revenue. Despite the fact
that the profit and loss statement is universally acknowledged to be the
more important statement, the conservative approach, i.e., the balance sheet,
usually is preferred to the matching approach, i.e., profit and loss, be-
cause the latter justifies carrying expenses like research and development
as assets. Unfortunately, this profit and loss approach requires a crystal ball
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of absolute clarity, and in the absence of such a device, the danger of using
overly optimistic predictions to cast a statement of income is obvious. Accord-
ingly, accounting ordinarily does not recognize income until it is realized,
though it often anticipates unfavorable occurrences.
A type of option available to business management that does not have
accounting as its source is the option of "business decision." Some of these
are obvious, such as decisions to change advertising levels, to change mainte-
nance levels within limits or to change pay rates. Others are a little more
obscure, such as advancing or retarding shipments to change the timing of
sales, selection of particular investments to sell on the basis of comparative
cost, manufacturing for inventory versus reducing the labor force, or leasing
versus buying capital assets.
By now it should be clear that management decisions do indeed influ-
ence earnings. This should not be surprising. Accounting was devised for
the particular purpose of reporting on management. In any case, any mis-
conception that accounting should, and therefore someday will, be a strictly
objective measurement of the true situation without the intrusion of any
subjective processes, should be dispelled.
What should also be clear is that conglomerates, being highly diversified
business activities, should encounter a high proportion of the situations re-
quiring accounting decisions. It should be equally clear that conglomerates
can be expected to have highly sophisticated professional-type managements
who will make sophisticated use of accounting options. A careful reading
of annual reports of some of the well-known conglomerates will show clever
use of accounting options and of business options.
But at some point in the ethical scale, use to achieve a purpose becomes
misuse. The essence of the accounting charge against conglomerates is that
they have misused accounting options to distort reported results. What
should be examined, therefore, is which options have been so misused and
whether these constitute a peculiarity of conglomerates.
The two abuses of accounting most often attributed to conglomerates
are "instant earnings" and "funny money." In addition to having acquired
disparaging nicknames, these two objects of reform have something else in
common - they arise through the merger process. Since merger activity and
conglomerates have a high correlation, these abuses have come to be asso-
dated with conglomerates even though there is no conceptual reason for
this association.
"Instant earnings" is the process of making use of the lack of compat-
ibility of balance sheet and profit and loss statements. Instant earnings are
achieved by selling off all at once assets whose carrying value, presumably
cost, is lower than realizable current value. In the conglomerate case, the
instant earnings charge arises when the cost is that of a component company
merged into the group, and the realization occurs after the merger, thus
resulting in the recording of earnings for the entire group. The assets often
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are investment securities, but they don't have to be. For example, they can
be motion picture film libraries with rerun values; they can be operating
real estate with a low depreciated value; or they can be real property ac-
quired for its natural resource value that has become more valuable for
other purposes. Any asset which is accounted for under the conservative
rules of accounting that forbid recognition of unrealized gains is a target
for a new management to convert into instant earnings.
"Funny money" is a company's own equity security used as considera-
tion for a merger. The issuing company can manufacture such money almost
without cost. To the receiver, however, it has value. Thus, so goes the
accusation, mergers accomplished through the issuance of equity securities
tend to be overpaid for, without proper accounting to the prior holders of
equity securities.
The accounting device that makes both these practices possible is the
pooling of interest. Technically precise definitions of poolings are plentiful,
but for the sake of this discussion, the following will suffice. A pooling of
interest is a method of accounting for a combination of businesses which
provides continuous accounting for all the components. The opposite of
poolings is purchase accounting, which assumes that one business has been
sold, and, as is the case with any sale, it is the new cost, not the seller's orig-
inal cost, that has to be accounted for.
Thus, in a pooling of interests, equity securities with a market value
far in excess of the value of the acquired business can be issued, and only
the book value of the selling company will be taken into the combination.
If the selling company has conservatively recorded long-term assets, the only
thing necessary to produce instant profits for the combined enterprise is to
sell the assets and realize unrecorded profits.
Since pooling is the common denominator of the most flagrant of ac-
counting abuses, it is pooling that has become the target for reform. For
several years the pressure has been mounting within the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants to do something about pooling. Two research
studies have been published by the Institute, one dealing with the merger
transaction and one dealing with the unpopular aspect of purchase account-
ing - goodwill. 2
Goodwill is the leftover in a purchase transaction. It comes about when
the price paid for a company exceeds the aggregate current fair value that
can be placed on the identifiable assets. The thing called goodwill by ac-
countants can be goodwill in the popular sense; it can be cost of getting a
head start, that is, a kind of combined organization expense and start-up
cost; or it can be simply the excess of cost paid over the fair value of tangible
assets received in exchange.
2 Catlett & Olson, Accounting for Goodwill, ARS No. 10 (1968); Wyatt, A Critical
Study of Accounting for Business Combinations, ARS No. 5 (1963).
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Usually there is not much objection to setting up goodwill; the problem
is getting rid of it. The costs of all assets of a corporation, with the exception
of those having a permanent value, ultimately find their way to the state-
ment of profit and loss. The simple fact is that the existence of goodwill at
any time or over any period is difficult to demonstrate and impossible to
quantify. Thus, an accounting convention has developed whereby purchased
goodwill must be recorded at cost, but write-offs may await demonstration
that the goodwill has been dissipated. This means that the subsequent write-
off may be all at once rather than by methodical charges to income over a
period. Not everyone handles goodwill this way, however. There are many
companies which follow the practice of orderly write-offs over a period.
This brings into focus the options available to merger engineers:
If instant earnings are available and you want them - pool;
If the combined companies show the proper earnings trend, and you
want to add results of operations before and after the combination
-pool;
If the combined earnings before the merger are more than they will be
immediately after the combination, and you want to show only the
earnings history of the acquiring company - purchase;
If the tax situation is such that a stepped-up basis is attractive, set up a
taxable deal; this will ordinarily result in a purchase;
If purchase accounting results in substantial goodwill, substantiate its
continued existence to avoid amortization against subsequent in-
come; remember, goodwill amortization is not deductible - these
are 100-cent dollars.
It should not be inferred that a completely free choice exists between
pooling and purchase accounting. In spirit, pooling is supposed to apply
where there is an exchange of equities only. There is some disagreement
among accountants whether pooling accounting is required or permitted
when appropriate conditions exist. Even under the more restrictive rules,
however, it is usually possible to structure a transaction to achieve the desired
result. The most difficult stumbling block is often the tax rule. Sellers gen-
erally want a tax-free deal while buyers often prefer a stepped-up basis. The
tax rules for tax-free mergers are not identical with the accounting rules for
poolings but they do interfere.
ACTIVITIES OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
The Accounting Principles Board (APB) is convinced that the time has
come to change the rules of accounting for mergers. It has considered ways
of restricting poolings, ways of eliminating poolings, ways of reducing good-
will, ways of writing off goodwill and, finally, ways of eliminating goodwill
entirely.
This is an attempt to deal with all the accounting aspects of merger
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accounting in one Opinion,8 an audacious and commendable effort. Indeed,
it could be the most significant single accounting development in the finan-
cial world in many years, because the accounting rules may have a profound
effect on merger activity itself.
There are many who feel strongly that unrealistic amounts of goodwill
are being recorded in present-day mergers and, even more strongly, that
amortization of such goodwill would result in an improper charge against
earnings. An attempt to fit such a conviction into the present logical struc-
ture of accounting can produce a chain of reasoning like this:
First, comes the effort to restrict accounting to those business combina-
tions that are true mergers. Such mergers have the characteristics
of retention of businesses, inclusion of all assets of both companies,
and continuity of ownership.
Second, comes the realization that such abstract characteristics are
easily stated but impossible to apply. The biggest single reason is
that their demonstration depends on events after the merger and
after the accounting has been set.
Third, comes the idea of simply limiting poolings to companies with a
certain relative size. This is quickly understood to substitute a
mechanical rule for a concept and, therefore, to be workable only
under adversary conditions.
Fourth, comes the feeling that poolings must go, because without the
support of a business concept the accounting principle has no
validity.
Fifth, comes the comprehension that the only alternative to poolings is
purchase accounting which, if based on stock market valuations,
can produce an enormous amount of goodwill. Stock prices of the
conglomerates, just as much as those of other companies, discount
hoped for future events. Where very large earnings multiples ob-
tain, use of stock market quotations give very large purchase prices
that probably could not be supported in sales of the same size
blocks for cash.
Sixth, comes an attempt to avoid these large numbers by measuring
these deals by the other side; namely, the value of the bundle of
net assets received instead of the market value of the stock given.
Seventh, comes an appreciation that this requires assignment of a value
to an asset, goodwill, that can have no measure other than cost. If
cost determines value then value cannot determine cost.
Eighth, comes the conclusion that the only practical way to cut through
this dilemma would be arbitrarily to limit the recording of good-
will to some predetermined set of conditions, such as where there
is a demonstrable cost, i.e., cash and other non-equity transactions
where the cost can be measured.
3 This Opinion will be published in 1970.
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To the writer this is an unsatisfactory solution, but a vivid illustration
of the dilemma in which the APB finds itself.
IS THE POOLING CONCEPT VALID?
It is difficult to comprehend the forces that seek to eliminate poolings
as an accepted accounting concept when it has proved so useful over the
past 25 years. Surely some of the defenders of poolings sincerely believe in
the concept. At least some of the users of the principle must have done so
in good faith. Not all of them must have had sinister ulterior motives. What
then accounts for the pressures to banish poolings of interest from the com-
munity of generally accepted principles of accounting?
The conclusion seems inescapable that the unpopularity of poolings is
a direct outgrowth of the correlation between conglomerates and the dis-
tortions of "instant earnings" and "funny money." One suspects that the
pressure on poolings would subside if "instant earnings" could be isolated
and kept out of post-merger earnings per share, and if the obligations against
the future created by unusual types of equity securities were made more
evident. In other words, the need may be not for the elimination of the
poolings concept but for the tightening of the accounting techniques con-
glomerate managements are alleged to have misused.
There is also a need for the clear articulation of poolings of interests as
a business concept. Thus far, poolings of interest have been solely an ac-
counting concept. The phrase is almost never used except in accounting
discussion. If poolings are to survive, and the writer feels they should sur-
vive to avoid sweeping the goodwill question under the rug, they are going
to have to be defined in business terms. This precludes use of relative size
and other mechanical concepts and calls for a logical description of the trans-
action. Ideally, such a description would automatically show who should
and who should not pool.
Heretofore, descriptions have been attempted of the pooling transaction
by calling it a transaction between shareholders outside the business entities.
This description carries little conviction because it depicts an unreal situa-
tion. The central core of the poolings idea is that the earnings stream should
not be interrupted by the merger. All other ideas surrounding the concept
are subordinate. To maintain the earnings stream means to retain the histor-
ical costs of investment in producing assets. Purchase accounting, on the
other hand, produces a new set of costs, new estimates of useful lives of
long-term assets, and all the other changes in measurements of earnings that
occur when assets are sold.
Thus, if the concept of poolings is justified, it is necessary to establish
that there is a set of conditions where a change in the holders of capital
stock by a merger has no effect on the business conducted by the corporation.
So far in the business combinations debate, little attention has been
paid to the nature of corporations themselves. Absent the private company
concept, I suppose all corporations are legally equivalent. From a social
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standpoint, however, some are merely incorporated extensions of their
owners' business activities. Others are independent, practically immortal,
entities of their own.
The latter, it will be recognized, are the ones whose stockholders, in
the words of Berle and Means, 4 have exchanged the privileges of ownership
for the wages of capital. Having made such an exchange, the stockholders
have no power or possibility of entering into transactions affecting the entire
corporation.
It can be seen that the shareholders of this type of corporation are pre-
cisely the ones to whom the idea of a merger being a transaction between
shareholders outside the business is least applicable. Corporations whose
shareholders are in a position to negotiate a transaction of this magnitude
are likely to be owned by a small, closely-knit group of shareholders. This
type of corporation is likely to comprise simply an incorporated form of
doing business by a small group of individuals. Mergers of such corporations
are likely to be tax-free forms of sellouts. Viewed from another direction,
they are likely to involve significant changes in the way of doing business.
Mergers by the publicly held corporation, on the other hand, are less
likely to involve basic changes in the business. Obviously, some changes are
probable or else the merger would not be justified. There is a difference,
however, between changes resulting from the changes in management of the
larger corporations, and changes resulting from the folding of a personally
managed company into the impersonal structure of the modern publicly
held corporation.
Seen in this light, one of the difficulties being experienced by the pool-
ing concept turns out to be a poor method of expressing an idea. Instead of
justifying a pooling on the grounds that it is a transaction by the stock-
holders, one should say it is a transaction on behalf of the stockholders.
Accordingly, the public corporations are the corporations to whom the
pooling-of-interests concept appears to be valid. Thus, if two publicly held
corporations merged solely through an exchange of equity capital, it is per-
fectly rational to take the position that nothing has happened to disturb the
historical continuity of either. If, on the other hand, one of the companies is
not publicly held we may assume the owners of that corporation have simply
used a tax-free method of selling out their business.
A ready-made means of identifying publicly held corporations already
exists in the definitions under the 1964 amendments to the Securities Acts.
It will be recalled that, subject to certain other conditions, any corporation
with equity securities held of record by more than 500 persons must register
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5
Additionally, a few corporations have achieved an existence of their
4 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed.
1968).
515 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 1 (1964).
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own without public ownership. These, as was recognized by Berle and
Means,6 are the small number of giant family corporations. They, too,
should be eligible for the pooling concept, but under strictly defined rules.
Unfortunately, the need for absolute objectivity overrides the desire for
conceptual accuracy. Thus, conditions of relative size, continuity of man-
agement and continuation of the business, and perhaps even absolute size
would have to be imposed on these relatively few candidates.
Only one type of transaction should be eligible for pooling treatment:
the common stock for common stock transaction. This is the one that affects
only the wages of capital. Transactions that introduce cash consideration,
debt securities or preferential securities affect the corporation itself. These
should not be considered pooling transactions.
With this framework it is logical to require that pooling transactions
require pooling accounting, and purchase transactions require purchase ac-
counting. The fiction of accounting for goodwill as if it did not exist because
it is too hard to measure would be unnecessary.
A few cases of difficult valuations of transactions would persist. We can
hope and forecast that these would tend to disappear, however, because the
attractiveness of unusual securities would be reduced. The subterfuge of
designing securities that appear like equity to the issuer and like debt to the
holder would no longer be available.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it is not necessary to affirm or deny that abuses of account-
ing exist in the business practices of conglomerates. If they do exist, the
proper target for attack is the accounting principle, not the conglomerate.
Especially inappropriate is the indirect form of attack using poolings of
interests as the primary target. Poolings of interests have a demonstrated
history of usefulness and they can be defined in business terms to remove
them from the area of alternative accounting techniques. Once this is done,
poolings of interests will assume their rightful place in the business world,
that of a form of business transaction that has its own appropriate account-
ing presentation - one that is appropriate for no other.
6 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 4.
